"Sue Campbell's Interpreting the Personal (1997) is a work of philosophy that responds to both mainstream male and feminist philosophers. Campbell begins by noting and deploring the philosophic neglect of feelings, but this is only the first part of a complex argument in which she engages philosophers who do focus on feelings. She rejects many of the usual philosophic taxonomies that distinguish feelings, moods, impulses, and physiological sensations from more complex emotional states, preferring to speak interchangeably of affect, feelings, and emotions - what she broadly labels the "aesthetic sphere of the mind" (Campbell 1997, 13). She also rejects dependence on the various lists of "classic" emotions that have been produced within philosophy, noting that "there are more feelings on heaven and earth than are discussed in most peoples' philosophies" (1997, 153). Campbell does not hesitate to take on well-known scholars of the emotions, as she charges Charles Darwin, William James, Gilbert Ryle, and William Alston with overemphasizing the classic emotions, undertheorizing the linkages between emotion and behavior, and failing to develop an adequate theory of the individuation of emotion. Her own argument about individuation and expression are an attempt to respond to these caesuras.
The core argument about the individuation and expression of feelings moves Campbell toward consideration of context and the interpersonal. Claiming that "feelings cannot be identified as the internal states of a person" (1997, 132), Campbell addresses the question that has provoked writers and thinkers of many descriptions--the question of whether, or to what extent, individuals have privileged access to their own feelings, desires, or mental states. Further, scholars must attend to the environment in which interpretation takes place, what Campbell describes variously as "conditions of interpretation" (1997, 115) and "communicative and interpretive circumstances" (1997, 139), and to the expressive resources that individuals bring to the interpretive encounter.
These arguments regarding expression and individuation of feelings are necessary to Campbell's perspective on affect as she emphasizes the role of other individuals and interpretive communities in authorizing and shaping individuals' feelings. Campbell dubs her argument externalist, a label that suggests a commitment to exploring the intersubjective environment within which feelings are individuated and named. She allows that her approach does share certain features in common with social constructivist approaches to interpretation and affective meaning, most notably in her agreement that individuals do not have privileged access to, or authority over, affective meanings. On the other hand, Campbell points out that social constructivists cannot adequately account for the ability of individuals, who may or may not be members of oppressed groups, to produce and express unconventional "outlaw" emotions. The individualism that Campbell finds in, among other sources, Sylvia Plath's poem "Cut," is a rebuke to feminists like Naomi Scheman and Allison Jaggar, who privilege the politics of interpretive communities over the potentially singular feelings of unique individuals.
Campbell's argument finally yields a warning about others' control of our emotional lives and a call for responsibility for the impact of our interpretations on the emotional lives of others. Because "[t]he necessary public nature to expression gives others ways of controlling our affective lives" (1997, 165) we must exercise control over who our affective interpreters are when our own feelings are at stake. At the same time, we must be responsible interpreters of the feelings of others, refusing to collaborate in the silencing of uncomfortable, unfamiliar, or politically useless feelings. "[I]ndividuals and groups are emotionally manipulated through the unsympathetic or hostile interpretive practices of others" (1997, 165).
Here is a relational argument that is consistent with many feminist relational accounts of the self in psychology, although it is not psychological itself. Campbell joins many other feminist scholars in interrupting familiar understandings of individualism in philosophy, political theory, and psychology. She counters received notions of individualism with an emphasis on context and communicative interdependence at the same time that she propounds a different configuration of individualism against the intervention of social constructionism and some feminisms. Throughout, Campbell's examples, drawn from literature, feminist writing, and mainstream philosophy, are provocative and occasionally humorous.
In doing so, she also reinstates the personal as an important dimension in analytic philosophy of mind. She argues that the category of feelings has a unique role in psychological explanation: the expression of feelings is the attempt to communicate personal significance. To develop a model for affective meaning, she moves attention away from the classic emotions to feelings that are more personal, inchoate, and idiosyncratic. Drawing examples from such sources as Audre Lorde, Miriam Tlali, essayist Rick Bass, and Rostand's Cyrano de Bergerac, Campbell argues, from a feminist perspective, that what we feel can be individuated through expression to sympathetic interpreters, or it can be distorted and constricted in unsympathetic or oppressive interpretive communities. She examines the complex role of public interpretation in the formation of personal experience, and the political use of such criticisms as bitter, sentimental, and overemotional. Her work makes the political dimension of emotional expression explicit".
From C. Burack - Hypatia 14.3 (1999) 176-178 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3burack.html)
From Campbell, S. (1997). Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation of Feelings. London: Cornell University Press:
"One of the most powerful and aggressive moves that one human being can make towards another or others at the level of understanding is to deny another human being the reality of their emotional expression.
Emotions are both embodied and socially constructed. To ignore the role of the body and to say that emotions are just socially constructed, or vice versa, is to deny the significance of personal experience held in the realm of social being. The significance of human, being.
Trait words such as bitter, sentimental, or emotional can be used to characterise folks who are emotionally expressive in ways that suggest that the person should not be taken seriously.
The significance of our affective being is always tentatively construed, and can easily be undermined. Through the use of labels such as these ones above, by refusing uptake of one person's emotional expression to another, the expressive person may end up never being able to find, and see, their own intentions. For example, if no one takes my anger seriously in terms of attempting to account for their own behaviour, but rather labels me as oversensitive or 'emotional', I may become unsure about how to describe, express or own, my own behaviour.
To label another person or group of persons as 'bitter', 'sentimental' or 'emotional' may undermine the struggle for group memory, by failing to provide the uptake that turns personal story into public record. It shifts the focus from the actions that have been done, or the experience as it has happened, to the psychology of the emoter. It says, ' forget whether you think I've done wrong by you, your emotional style is actually the problem'.
Being portrayed as spilling, or on the edge of excessive, destroys confidence in the possible success of expressive acts and the hopes that sit, behind them.
Rather than gracing mutuality and responsibility, labelling someone as emotional creates a context of separation, denying each person in the picture the luxury of cultivating sympathetic, if not empathetic, emotional lives.
Your role as a listener is vital.
Your listening stance as a receiver is response-able.
Your heart, in your utterances of response, is palpable".
As a pretty important postscript to that, it's important to note the differences between uncontained expression of emotion as a symtom of responding to absent self elements, dissolution and dissociation from emotion where there is a different type of strategy in dealing with absent self elements, and the contained yet expressive intimacy of the secure positions. It is critical for me to see Campbell's work as a pointer to a very mature, late-stage development horizon where the containment of self is solid enough to survive and withstand the beautiful liberation of self-encounter she encourages. The dismissing strategies which Campbell is responding to (and presumably in the context of a feminist problematic of sexual difference for women), is, in my pinion, fundamentally hamstrung because it doesn't realise is that this capacity to feel, incarnate, express and survive emotional functions is itself a containment of a much larger expression of our being. It's almost as if there's a pre-trans situation with containment - pre- is suppression, conventional is opportunistic/idiosyncratic rule-based containment, trans- containment is found in the secure situation of not being scared of emotion and entering into relation with it with utter bravery and sensitised curiosity... and then seeing that as a grand container-contained. I'm off to research this some more, as the elements of mature containment together with the translucent healthy permeability which people like Arjunah Ardagh speak of is exactly where I want to live. It's where the demands of my ego-development need me to go (e.g. Jenny Wade's Authentic stage onwards).
Here's to continuing to find and broaden that container with my intentional communities as this splendour of mature relations continues to grow. Again, bliss!
http://www.thepresentparticiple.blogspot.com

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